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Mark Olssen 
 
 
I wish to demonstrate in this paper that Foucault’s conception of governmentality 
provides a powerful tool for understanding developments in relation to learning and 
education.  
 
My thesis will be that the radicalness of Foucault’s thesis is much greater than many 
writers on Foucault seem to realise.   
 
For what is offered by Foucault’s conception I will argue is a new version of 
superstructural sociology which provides a means of understanding how educational 
and economic practices mutually condition and adapt to each other while avoiding the 
excesses that plagued Marxist analyses in the later 20
th
 century which represented 
such processes as the outcome of a necessary determination.  
 
I will identify lifelong learning as a specifically neoliberal form of state reason which 
has manifested a uniformly consistent – albeit not exclusive concern - of serving 
dominant economic interests 
 
The prospects for moving beyond it depend, I will claim, on whether the structures of 
learning created can be harnessed for other ends; that is, whether embryonic within 
the discursive programme of lifelong learning is the possibility of linking the 
discourse to a progressive emancipatory project based upon egalitarian politics and 
social justice. Is it indeed possible that we can all be inhabitants of a genuinely 
learning society? And what would such a society look like? 
 
By way of structure, my paper will comprise the following sections: first, an 
elucidation of Foucault’s concept of governmentality; second, the inherent dangers 
afflicting lifelong learning programmes of being harnessed in the interests of 
neoliberal reason, through discourses of flexibility or flexible specialisation; and third, 
the possibilities and prospects for lifelong learning to break out of its neoliberal shell 
transforming itself away from discourses of neoliberal flexibilisation to representing 
discourses of democratisation and social justice. 
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Foucault’s concept of governmentality 
 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality refers to the structures of power by which 
conduct is organised, and by which governance is aligned with the self-organising 
capacities of individual subjects.  
 
It deals with particular models of governing individuals.  Foucault developed this 
conception of power in the late 1970s in his courses at the Collège de France in order 
to provide a more macro dimension to enable him to theorise models of power which 
dealt with of collective governance.  
 
While in his genealogical studies he had analysed micro and disciplinary dimensions 
of pastoral power and bio-power, giving shape to modern institutions such as schools, 
prisons and hospitals,  
 
partly no doubt as a response to the sorts of criticisms that Duccio Trombadori 
levelled at him in the interviews of 1978, concerning the overly ‘localistic’ nature of 
his analysis of power, rendering it impossible to insert individual events within a 
broader political perspective, that Foucault shifted his analysis to represent the 
collective dimensions of governmental power as manifested by such agencies as the 
modern state. 
 
His aim was not, however, to ascertain the legitimacy to state power, or the 
management of states, but to understand the nature of governmental rationalities 
linked to specific technologies in terms of how collective power was exercised over 
individuals.  
 
“How”, not in the sense of “How does it manifest itself?” but “By what means is 
it exercised?” and “What happens when individuals exert (as they say) power 
over others?” (1982: 217) 
 
This is what Foucault meant by government, which referred to a form of activity 
aimed to guide and shape conduct.   
 
To govern thus designates “the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups 
might be directed….[it] is to structure the possible field of action of others” (p.221)  
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In ‘The Subject and Power’ (1982: 221) essay Foucault alludes to the equivocal 
nature of the term conduct as it pertains to power relations. For, on the one hand it 
pertains to “lead[ing] others (according to mechanisms of coercion which are, to 
varying degrees strict)” and, on the other “a way of behaving within a more or less 
open field of possibilities” (pp. 220-221)1. Hence, he says (p. 221) “The exercise of 
power consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible 
outcome”. And this is what makes the issue of power, “less a confrontation between 
two adversaries…than a question of government” (p. 221).  
 
To speak of government or power is to presuppose that “certain people exercise 
power over others”, which is to speak of “relationships” (p. 217). In this sense, power 
relations are distinct from “objective abilities” as well as from “relations of 
communication”, yet they can be “grasped in the diversity of their logical sequence, 
their abilities, and their interrelationships” (p. 219).   
 
What is important to see here is that for Foucault power is not an entity, but rather a 
relation of forces. What constitutes the specific nature of power is that it is a “set of 
actions upon other actions”; that is, it is  
 
a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it 
induces, it seduces, it makes it easier or more difficult; in the extreme it 
constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon 
an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of 
action. (p. 220) 
 
What is also important is that power is exercised strategically only over free subjects. 
By the word strategy Foucault means three things: 
 
First, to designate the means employed to attain a certain end, it is a question of 
rationality functioning to arrive at an objective.  Second, to designate the 
manner in which a partner in a certain game acts with regard to what he thinks 
should be the action of the others and what he considers the others think to be 
his own; it is the way in which one seeks to have the advantage over others.  
Third…it is a question…of the means used to obtain victory. (pp. 224 – 225) 
 
A power strategy then is “the totality of means put into operation to implement power 
effectively or to maintain it” (p. 225) To the extent that such relations of power are 
open and fluid, there is a degree of instability permitting the possibility of 
reversal, or modification. In this sense, while hegemonies exist, they exist 
precariously. To the extent to which relations of power have become congealed, or 
fixed, it represents a “strategic situation, more or less taken for granted and 
consolidated by means of a long term confrontation between adversaries” (p. 226).  
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In a 1978 lecture at the Collège de France, Foucault (1991) introduces the term 
governmentality  to supplement pastoral power and biopower. Governmentality has 
dual functions as individualising and totalising, in shaping both individuals and 
populations, in order to understand the collective exercise of power.  
 
If ‘bio-power’ referred to disciplinary power introduced in the early modern period in 
order to rationalise the problems afflicting populations, governmentality pertains to 
the specificity of power relations with its concern to shape conduct as part of broader 
issue involving the political exercise of power.   
 
It includes “techniques and procedures for directing human behaviour” (1997c: 81).  
It pertains, he says (1991: 87-88) to “a concern with the art of government…of how to 
be ruled, how strictly, by whom, to what end, by what methods, etc”.  In addition, the 
concept can be applied to the family, religion, the economy, as well as the state. In its 
most general sense it pertains to the “problematic of government in general” (p. 88) 
and articulates “a kind of rationality” (p. 89).  
 
For Foucault (1991: 90), the art of government is also concerned with the issue of 
security, of stabilising the fragile link between ruler and ruled, of rendering it 
legitimate, “to identify dangers… to develop the art of manipulating relations of force 
that will allow the Prince to ensure the protection of his principality”.  
 
The concept of security is, along with governmentality, a central concept for 
Foucault, and is concerned with the issue of how the state deals with unpredictable 
events, how it evaluates and calculates the costs and consequences, and how it 
manages populations within constraint, rather than through the imposition of rule. 
Indeed, “one need[s] to analyze the series: security, population, government” (1991: 
87) as part of a combined approach.  
 
While sovereignty is concerned with the problem of rule through the imposition of 
Law, security is concerned with the management of populations.  The intersection of 
security and government occurs with the concern for the regulation of populations” 
and the search for “mechanisms capable of ensuring its regulation” (1997a: 67). 
While the issue of security is relevant in all periods of history, it became of increased 
concern in the 18
th
 century, and affected the form and practice of government. 
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Historicized rationalities 
 
In his later works and interviews, Foucault’s presents the outline of a genealogy of 
power, tracing the different historical modalities in the way models of power have 
functioned at different periods.  
 
In lectures given in 1978/9 and specifically in the Tanner lectures (see 2000a), 
Foucault argues that a history of the forms of rationality by which power operates is 
more effective than an abstract conception or model of power. Power is rationalised in 
different periods in different ways, yet the basis of its rationalisation is different from 
the rationality of economic processes, or of scientific discourses. What he is concerned 
to do is ascertain the form of rationality at stake. Although he says (2001a: 325) that 
“for several centuries the state has been one of the most redoubtable forms of human 
government”, it is important to examine the “nascent state rationalities” in the course 
of their historical development if we are to understand the paradoxes of our present 
forms of government in relation to its management of the learning of its subjects.   
 
In this he identifies a variety of historically situated rationalities, including pastoral 
power, raison d’etat, Polizei, liberal, and neoliberal reason, which together span the 
period from ancient times until the present, all comprising specific arts of government 
or forms of governmentality. Although Foucault’s interests were more generally 
confined to the arts of government of populations, my interest in this paper is to 
ascertain the relevance of his approach specifically for discourses of knowledge and 
learning, structured as they are in relation to particular agendas of interest and power. 
 
 
Lifelong learning as a neoliberal art of government 
 
In Foucault’s sense, lifelong learning represents a model of governing individuals in 
their relation to the collective.   
 
More specifically it constitutes a technology of control.   
 
Its specific governmental significance can be seen in the EU which has declared 
lifelong learning as a central educational project, in its quest to integrate 25 
populations into a new European identity. As the European Commission (2002: 4) has 
stated: 
 
Lifelong learning is an overarching strategy of European co-operation in 
education and training policies and for the individual.  The lifelong learning 
approach is an essential policy strategy for the development of citizenship, 
social cohesion, employment and for individual fulfilment.  
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As in the Lisbon Memorandum on lifelong learning, (European Commission, 2000) 
the European Commission established lifelong learning, both in its informal and 
formal senses,  as a major asset for the Eurpoean Union, especially related to the tasks 
of regional development and integration, modernisation and the promotion of human 
capital and employability. 
 
To understand the dangers and possibilities associated with recent models of learning 
in order to understand the sense in which theories of learning and power interact, we 
must understand Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism.  
 
Neoliberalism refers to a particular economic model which in the context of this 
paper, pertains to the way that practices of economics and discursive patternings of 
knowledge and learning interact.  
 
As a particular model of power it emerged as a revision of classical economic 
liberalism in the 1970s in the USA and Britain as a response to stagflation and the 
collapse of Bretton Woods system of international trade and exchange, leading to the 
abolition of capital controls in 1974 in America and 1979 in Britain (Mishra, 1999, 
Stiglitz, 2002).  
 
These policies made it extremely difficult to sustain Keynesian demand management. 
Exchange rates were floated and capital controls abolished, giving money and capital 
the freedom to move across national boundaries.  
 
Far from being an inevitable process reflecting the inevitable post-Fordist 
determinations of the economic, neoliberalism must still be understood as the 
deliberate policy of those in power.  
 
As Paul Hirst (2000b: 179) states, the creation of markets has been engineered by 
particular policies. It was public policy, not market pressures, that led to the 
deregulation of capital markets and the removal of exchange controls in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s.  As he states:  
 
What is supposed to be an inevitable market-driven global process is actually 
substantially a product of public policy…It was influential economic policy 
elites and state officials in advanced states that shaped the deregulatory free-
market vision of world trade. 
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Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism 
 
In his lectures at the Collège de France in 1978 and 1979 Foucault focuses his 
attention on classical liberals such as Adam Smith, David Hume and Adam Ferguson, 
and two variants of post second world war neoliberals: the Ordoliberalen in Germany 
and the Human Capital theorists in the United States. (Lemke, 2001; Burchell, 1991, 
1996; Foucault, 1982b, 1984, 1991, 1992, 1993,1997a, 1997b, 2001a, 2001b). 
 
The Ordoliberalen comprised a group of jurists and economists in the years 1928-
1930 who published in the yearbook Ordo.  Amongst their numbers were included 
William Röpke, Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, Alexander Rüstow, Alfred Müller-
Armack and others.   
 
Preaching the slogan that ‘inequality is equal for all’ they devised a social market 
economy influencing the shaping of West German economic policy as it developed 
after the war.   
 
 
Foucault refers to these Ordoliberalen as the ‘Freiberg School’ who had some 
affinities (of time and place) with the Frankfurt School but were of a very different 
political persuasion.  While they held that Nazism was a consequence of the absence 
of liberalism, they did not see liberalism as a doctrine based upon the natural freedom 
of the individual that will develop by itself of its own volition.   
 
In fact, for the ‘Freiberg School’ the market economy was not an autonomous, or 
naturally self-regulating entity at all.  As a consequence, their conception of the 
market and of the role of competition, says Foucault, is radically anti-naturalistic.  
Rather than the market being a natural arena which the state must refrain from 
interfering with, it is rather constituted and kept going by the state’s political 
machine.  Similarly, competition is not a natural fact which emerges spontaneously 
from human social intercourse, as a result of human nature, but must be engineered 
by the state. 
 
As a consequence of this, the traditional distinction between a sphere of natural 
liberty and a sphere of government intervention no longer holds, for the market 
order and competition are engineered by the practices of government.  Both the 
state and the market are on this conception artificial and both presuppose each other.   
 
 
In Foucault’s view such a conception means that the principle of laissez-faire, which 
can be traced back to a distinction between culture (the artificial state) and nature (the 
self-regulating market), no longer holds.   
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For the Ordoliberalen, the history of capitalism is an institutional history.  
Capitalism is a particular contingent apparatus by which economic processes and 
institutional frameworks are articulated. Not only is there no ‘logic of capital’ in this 
model, but the Ordoliberalen held that the dysfunctions of capitalism could only be 
corrected by political-institutional interventions which they saw as contingent 
historical phenomena.   
 
What this means, says Foucault, is that the Ordoliberalen support the active 
creation of the social conditions for an effective competitive market order.  Not 
only must government block and prevent anti-competitive practices, but it must fine-
tune and actively promote competition in both the economy and in areas where the 
market mechanism is traditionally least prone to operate.  
 
One policy to this effect was to ‘universalise the entrepreneurial form’ (Lemke, 
2001: 195) through the promotion of an enterprise culture, premised, as Foucault put 
it in a lecture given on 14
th
 February 1979, on ‘equal inequality for all’ (Lemke, 
2001: 195).   
 
The goal here was to increase competitive forms throughout society so that social and 
work relations in general assume the market form i.e., exhibit competition, obey laws 
of supply and demand.  In the writings of Rüstow, this was called ‘vital policy’ 
(‘Vitalpolitik’ ) which described policies geared to reconstructing the moral and 
cultural order to promote and reward entrepreneurial behaviour, opposing 
bureaucratic initiatives which stifle the market mechanism.   
 
To achieve such goals, the Ordoliberalen also advocated the redefining of law and 
of juridical institutions so that they could function to correct the market 
mechanism and discipline non-entrepreneurial behaviour within an institutional 
structure in accordance with, and supported by, the law.  In this sense, the 
Ordoliberalen were not simply anti-naturalist, but constructivist. 
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Human Capital Theory 
 
In his analysis of neoliberalism, Foucault also directs his attention to the Chicago 
School of Human Capital theorists in America, focussing particularly on the works of 
Becker.   
 
These neoliberals also opposed state interventionism when it was bureaucratic and 
supported it when it fostered and protected economic liberty.  For Human Capital 
theorists the concern was the uncontrolled growth of the bureaucratic apparatus as a 
threat to the freedom of the individual.   
 
Foucault sees the major distinction between the German and US neoliberals existing 
in the fact that in the US neoliberalism was much less a political crusade as it was in 
Germany or France, for in the US the critique was centrally directed against state 
interventionism and aimed to challenge the growth of the state apparatus.   
 
In his lecture of March 28, 1979, Foucault discusses Hayek and von Mises (whom he 
labels as the “intermediaries of US neoliberalism”), Simons, Schultz, Stigler and 
Gary Becker, whom he says is the most radical exponent in the US.   
 
The US neoliberals saw the Ordoliberalen as representing the political as being 
above and outside the market but constantly intervening to correct its 
bureaucratic dislocations.   
 
From their viewpoint, they wanted to extend the market across into the social arena 
and political arenas, thus collapsing the distinction between the economic, social and 
political in what constitutes a marketisation of the state.   
 
No longer is the state independent of and outside the market, but itself now subject to 
market laws.  In doing this, the US neoliberals extend economic criteria into spheres 
which are not economic and market exchange relations now govern all areas of 
voluntary exchange amongst individuals.   
 
In this model, the social and political spheres become redefined as economic 
domains.  The government and the public sector will be ‘economised’ to reflect 
market principles and mechanisms.  Thus the economic covers all of society and 
society is theorised as a form of the economic.   
 
The task of government is to construct and universalise competition to achieve 
efficiency and invent market systems.  As Foucault states, for the US neoliberals, the 
market becomes “a kind of permanent economic tribunal” (‘une sorte de tribunal 
économique permanent’) (Foucault, Lecture, March 21, 1979 – see Lemke 2001: 
198)
2
. 
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As Foucault sees HCT, it is concerned with the problem of labour in economic 
theory.  While classical political economy claimed that the production of goods 
depended upon real estate, capital, and labour, neo-liberals held that only real estate 
and capital are treated appropriately by the classical theory, and that labour needs 
greater illumination as an active, rather than as a passive, factor in production.   
 
In this sense neoliberals concurred with Marx that classical political economy 
had forgotten labour and thereby they misrepresent the process of production.  
In order to correct this deficiency, neoliberals theorise the role and importance of 
labour in terms of a model of human capital.  In essence their theory starts with the 
human individual in terms of a classification of skills, knowledge and ability.   
 
Becker distinguishes two central aspects to such human capital: (1) inborn, physical 
and genetic dispositions, and (2) education, nutrition, training and emotional health.   
 
In this model, each person is now an autonomous entrepreneur responsible 
ontologically for their own selves and their own progress and position.  Individuals 
have full responsibility over their investment decisions and must aim to produce a 
surplus value.  As Foucault puts it in his March 14, 1979 lecture, they are 
“entrepreneurs of themselves” 
 
As Graham Burchell (1996: 23-24) puts this point, while for classical liberalism the 
basis of government conduct is in terms of “natural, private-interest-motivated 
conduct of free, market exchanging individuals”, for neoliberalism “the rational 
principle for regulating and limiting governmental activity must be determined by 
reference to artificially arranged or contrived forms of free, entrepreneurial and 
competitive conduct of economic-rational individuals”.   
 
This means that for neoliberal perspectives, the end goals of freedom, choice, 
consumer sovereignty, competition and individual initiative, as well as those of 
compliance and obedience, must be constructions of the state acting now in its 
positive role through the development of the techniques of auditing, accounting and 
management.   
 
It is these techniques, as Barry, Osborne and Rose (1996: 14) put it: 
 
[that] enable the marketplace for services to be established as ‘autonomous’ 
from central control.  Neo-liberalism, in these terms, involves less a retreat 
from governmental “intervention” than a re-inscription of the techniques and 
forms of expertise required for the exercise of government. 
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While there is thus an important difference between those forms of liberalism that 
existed from the seventeenth to the end of the nineteenth century and the forms of 
neoliberalism that emerged in the twentieth century, the special nature of the 
relationship between government and governed, and the priority of a market of free 
associations within this relationship, constitutes a central and continuous thread 
through the various different forms of liberalism.  In this, as Burchell (1996: 23) 
points out, both early and later liberalism “set out a schema of the relationship 
between government and the governed in which individuals are identified as, on the 
one hand, the object and target of governmental action and, on the other hand, as in 
some sense the necessary (voluntary) partner or accomplice of government”.  
 
Lifelong learning as an instrument of flexible governmentality 
 
In this context lifelong learning can be represented a particular technology of power 
in the same senses, indeed the same way, that public choice theory, agency theory, or 
cost-transaction economics can be seen as technologies of power.  
 
Whereas the latter are global discourses pertaining to the management of public 
enterprises in market terms, lifelong learning represents a global discourse for the 
flexible preparation of subjects.  
 
While our basic theoretical model is not narrowly functionalist, or economistic, it can 
be observed that at a certain level of analysis, a functionalist explanation works: 
lifelong learning constitutes a specific technology which makes both the tertiary and 
non-tertiary labour force subject to a new form of flexible rationalistion which under 
national systems of Keynesian welfare nationalism never actually existed, which is to 
say, as Robert Boyer ( 1988: 258) has put it, that under Keynesian modes of 
regulation, the free development of global economies were “delayed because of a lack 
of social and technical means of controlling workers”. It is the global production of 
infinitely knowledgeable subjects that the technology of lifelong learning enables. It 
thus represents a specifically global and non-Keynesian means of constituting workers 
as knowledgeable subjects. 
 
The emergence of the technology serves in these senses as both cause and effect. On 
the one hand it enables both the individualisation of responsibility for education or 
learning, and on the other it enables the abolition of welfare obligations of states.  
 
In this sense, the technology of lifelong learning enabled a downgrading of social 
rights within any particular national territory in preference for a global level playing 
field characterised by equality of opportunity.  
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Its main strength is that it constitutes a flexible technology in a number of senses.  
 
First, it enables businesses and governments to avoid direct responsibility;  
 
second it enables the adaptability of workers in terms of their mobility within the 
workforce between businesses and countries.   
 
It thus enables the ability of workers to move from one job to another within a given 
overall production process, or within a production process that can switch between 
products and skills and which can itself be transitory.  
 
This kind of flexibility requires skill and competence of a potentially short term 
nature, features which did not characterize Taylorism or Fordism
3
.  
 
The key strategy, of which lifelong learning is a component is that of “workforce 
versatility”, which enables high levels of job mobility, premised on a high level of 
general and technical training and a ready ability to add new skills in order to make 
change possible.  
 
The lifelong worker thus equates directly with Proudhon’s “ideal worker” (l’ouvrier 
proudhonien).   
 
As a strategy, then, lifelong learning enables a growth in the permissiveness of legal 
restraints over conditions of work and employment, especially dismissal, within 
particular national boundaries.  
 
It translates as a proposal to increase the laxity of controls over employee rights and 
safeguards with regard to job security or protection ensuring an automatic mechanism 
of worker adaptability which reduces workers ties to a particular company or business 
by making the employment contract itself more flexible.  
 
A new regulatory environment is produced which increases the mobility of capital 
lessening its dependence on the traditional employment contract and absolving the 
establishment or company of responsibility for security and welfare.  
 
A new technology of flexible adaptation ensures that responsibility for employment 
tenure belongs to individuals themselves, ensures the possibility for companies to 
offset responsibility for social and fiscal payments, and enhances the freedom of 
business in a global environment.  
 
Paradoxically, such flexibility, as Robert Boyer (1988: 227) states, helps maintain the 
stability of certain aspects of economic life.  
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Hence discourses such as lifelong learning assist in stabilising work-individual 
relations by enabling the system or sub-system to respond to a variety of disturbances.  
 
It substitutes for the rights of workers over education and entitlement to knowledge an 
automatic system based on the ready availability of information and skills.  
 
Thus lifelong learning involves a re-structuring of the context of education in the 
interests of efficiency through flexibilisation. As Tuschling and Engemann (2005) 
state: 
 
The purpose is not to de-institutionalize but rather to inter-institionalize 
learning.  [This involves]…1. changing the field of learning in order to totalize 
learning to all imaginable situations. 2. initiating a change in the self-
performance of individuals that they act as learners in all imaginable situations.  
With these two components the learning individual is configured as an inter-
institutional entity traversing situations and institutions, obliged to strategically 
show knowledge and skills.  Especially non-formal and informal learning have 
to be presented as accessible and manageable.  This is the task of the third 
component of inter-institutionalization: the techniques that allow both 
individuals and institutions to inscribe, store, process and transfer actions as 
learning. The main activities of the European Union in this field are centred 
around these techniques.  It is within them that lifelong learning is getting a 
density and becomes most palpable. 
 
 
From knowledge to information 
 
Building upon the analysis above, as James Marshall (1996: 269) has noted, what is 
substituted in the neoliberal discourse of lifelong learning is knowledge for 
information:  
 
knowledge has been replaced by skills and learning. Everything which might 
have been seen as obtaining knowledge – an object of an activity – seems to 
have moved into an activity mode, where what is important is process  
 
In this, as Bert Lambeir (2005: 350) notes, “the bond between the information 
society and the learning society appears to be a very tight one”. As learning has been 
redefined in terms of process, and functions as information, it needs to be 
continuously relearned, readjusted and restructured to meet the needs of the consumer 
in the service information industry.   
 
Learning in this sense is an ongoing permanent addition of competences and skills 
adapted continuously to real external needs.   
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As Lambeir (351) states, “Learning now is the constant striving for extra 
competences, and the efficient management of acquired ones.  Education has become 
merely a tool in the fetishisation of certificates”.  
 
 The continual availability of information adapts learning and knowledge to the 
changing context of flexible production. In this sense, to echo Richard Edwards 
(1997: Chp. 2) it accommodates a world of constant change where the imperative 
or possibility of updating our knowledge and skills again and again and again in order 
to anticipate all possible transformation 
 
It is in this sense that the discourse of lifelong learning is a call for “permanent 
education” (Lambeir, 2005: 350). As Lambeir continues: 
 
Lifelong learning is the magic spell in the discourse of educational and 
economic policymakers, as well as in that of the practitioners of both domains. 
The Flemish minister of education for example declares lifelong learning to be 
one of the government’s priorities. She argues for equal learning opportunities 
for every individual, to encounter the threatening duality between those that did 
learn and still do, and those who do not use the educational facilities.  In order to 
meet this goal individualised learning advice and support will be necessary.  In 
this respect we might consider the following: first, learning activities must be 
presented as enjoyable, and related to the adult’s curiosity and to the creation of 
new opportunities.  Second, there is a need to set up a ‘digital learning mall’, a 
database which provides an overview of the learning opportunities offered in the 
country.  Finally, the opportunity to use information and communications 
technology to offer more flexible and need-orientated learning facilities, must be 
explored. 
 
Lifelong learning accommodates the global provision of education and skills on the 
basis of equality of opportunity, inclusiveness, emphasising the importance of key 
qualifications, basic skills and primary knowledge.  
 
As Lambeir notes, this is provided on the basis of “self-managed learning” 
incorporating a shift from “offer-orientated” to “question-orientated” education, or in 
Marshall’s terms, from knowing that to knowing how in which learning becomes 
nothing more (or less) than the public collection of competencies offered in the labour 
market of learning opportunities.  
 
While many of these are useful, one can never have enough, and one can never have 
enough fast enough. In this sense, lifelong learning is a market discourse that 
orientates education to the enterprise society where the learner becomes an 
entrepreneur of him/herself. What she becomes depends solely on herself and the 
choices she makes. She is responsible for herself. Such a model requires skills of self-
management and record keeping so that demonstrations of established learning are 
rendered transparent through audit.  
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Ultimately lifelong learning shifts responsibility from the system to the individual 
whereby individuals are responsible for self-emancipation and self-creation.  It is the 
discourse of autonomous and independent individuals who are responsible for 
updating their skills in order to achieve their place in society.  
 
For Foucault lifelong learning would constitute a new technology of power and part 
of the mechanisms of control operating in our society.  It is a discourse which aims at 
resolving the individual and the general; omnes et singulatum, in the interests of the 
smooth functioning of the whole.   
 
As well as constituting a strategy of government at the policy level, lifelong learning 
also constitutes a form of bio-power in that it aims to discipline subjects. Marshall 
(1995: 322) has proffered the term  busno-power which can be represented as 
characterising a particular form of bio-power.  Busno-power: 
 
 
Is directed at the subjectivity of the person, not through the body but through the 
mind, through forms of educational practices and pedagogy which, through 
choices in education, shape the subjectivities of autonomous choosers….this 
busno-power also impinges upon the population as a whole, as individual 
consumer activity “improves” both society and economy. 
 
Busno-power thus represents a distinctively neoliberal form of bio-power which 
constitutes individuals as autonomous choosers of their own lives.  In this model, 
then, lifelong learning embodies new techniques of self-regulation and aims to 
minimize the “time lag” between skills and individual development and economic and 
technological change (Kraus, 2001: 17; cited from Tuschling and Engemann, 2005). 
 
While lifelong learning implies an active as opposed to passive learner, when viewed 
in relation to neoliberal agendas it implies a shift in the control of authority for 
education from the collective to the individual, involving increasing responsibility of 
the individual for educational and work careers and the skills required and outcomes 
that ought to take place. Getting prepared is now more in the hands of the individual 
which entails greater risk in that the individual has to “co-finance his own learning” 
(Commission of the European Union, 2000: 15, cited from Tuschling and Engemann).  
 
Hence, as Anna Tuschling and Christoph Engemann (2005: 6) note: 
 
lifelong learning means self determination and self-responsibility in educational 
tasks, including the financial aspects…the lifelong learning discourse identifies 
a broad need to teach individuals to become autonomous learners. 
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As such, say Tuschling and Engemann (citing Gerlach, 2000: 189), lifelong learning 
represents an “internalized educational aspiration”, where the individual is not 
only responsible for the content of the knowledge, but also for the levels and 
structures and process and organisation.  
 
Essentially the learner becomes the entrepreneurs of their own development. 
What the states provide are the tools that facilitate the process. Not only must the 
individual learn, but they must learn to recognise what to learn, and what and when to 
forget what to learn when circumstances demand it, they say. They go on to cite 
Deleuze (1990) who characterizes the field of control in terms of “limitless 
postponements”, where “perpetual training” replaces specified levels, in what are 
characterized as techniques of “permanent self performance”.  They then state: 
 
The ability to orientate oneself in such a manner is condensed in the second core 
concept of lifelong learning, the so-called social competences and key 
qualifications…terms that point to basic self-organisational dispositions…of 
being able to interpret their own circumstances, self-directed in a way that leads 
to learning.(p.6) 
 
 
Learning for democracy 
 
In one important sense, we are all, or should be all, inhabitants of a future learning 
society.  
 
The key question becomes for what purposes is learning to be readily available, what 
ends should it serve. If it is simply “fast food for the brain” (Lambeir, 2005: 354) or 
concerned narrowly with cognitive and metacognitive skills in the interests of 
adaptability to the world of work and the constantly changing demands of capital then 
it becomes a means of enabling business to minimise or avoid its social 
responsibilities by offloading the social and educational costs of production in a 
constantly changing technological environment. 
 
The sort of learning society needed today is one that orientates learning and 
knowledge to survival.   
 
The continuance of traditions and customs which enable individuals to function 
effectively as members of communities requires not the endless addition of skills and 
information, but a progressive deepening of the political arts of democratic 
communication and negotiation through the skills of deliberation, contestation and 
debate.  
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Learning must move away from a concern with quantitative addition of cognitive and 
metacognitive skills to a concern with qualitative transformation of the subject 
through their active engagement in the educational process. Such a process does 
indeed involve accessing new information, adding new skills, but such a process must 
be in the context of active participation and engagement in the democratic structures 
through which the conflicts between individuals and society are accommodated, and 
through which change and transformation are effected. 
 
Clearly any meaningful idea of the learning society must embody, or express, 
principles that transcend the nation-state and embody principles of the free 
development of all peoples.  
 
This can be expressed as embodying the principles of cosmopolitanism which 
involves learning as a process of engagement with the “other”.  The commitment to 
cosmopolitanism embodies a commitment to reason and human rights in an equal 
distribution of the chances and prospects of survival.  
 
Self-organised learning certainly has a place in this scenario. But also essential are the 
twin values of freedom and participation as embodied, for instance, in Dewey’s 
pragmatism where learning embodies a mode of life where reason is exercised 
through problem-solving where the individual participates and contributes to the 
collective good of society and in the process constitutes their own development. In 
this model, the learning society is a global society of engagement.  
 
The learner is engaged in a process of action for change as part of a dialogic 
encounter rather than as a consequence of individual choice. Popkewitz, Olsson and 
Petersson (2005: 2) refer to this project as founded upon an “unfinished 
cosmopolitanism” where learning is talked about as “planning one’s biography as 
continuously solving problems, making choices and collaborating in ‘communities of 
learners’ in a process of cultural innovation”. They use the term ‘unfinished 
cosmopolitan’ rather than the phrase ‘lifelong learner’ is in order to “historicize the 
present”.  
 
Yet, it effects more than that, for just as it makes the individual inseparable from the 
collective, or rights inseparable from duties, so it makes learning inseparable from 
teaching. Hence learning is inseparable, as Wagner (1994: xiv) writes, from “the 
substantive foundations of a self-realisation and of shifting emphasis between 
individualised entitlements and public/collective capabilities” (cited in Popketwitz, et 
al., 2005).  
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For Popkewitz et al (2005): 
 
The narratives of the unfinished cosmopolitan as the Learning Society embody 
new relations between individuality (the lifelong learner) and the social.  The 
fabrication of the child as a problem solver no longer sediments responsibility in 
the range of social practices directed towards a single public sphere.  The new 
individuality traverses diverse and plural communities to constitute the common 
good…Reason is no longer for the perfection of the nation as the collective 
embodiment of the social good. Change, contingency and uncertainty in daily 
life are tamed through the rules and standards that place the problem solving 
child in diverse communities where the common good is formed…The 
unfinished cosmopolitan…is orientated to the future through unfinished 
processes that are viewed as expressing universal human attributes of reason, 
science and progress.  The unfinished cosmopolitan problem solves to chase 
desire and works in a global world in which there is no finishing line. 
 
In this new field, say Popkewitz et al (2005), the learning society no longer functions 
as an educational ideal, but as a political one.  In this sense, learning is integrally 
related to community, and as the systems of communication and language through 
which participation and learning take place are by their very nature social. Such a 
theme links directly to democracy as the mechanism through which individual and 
collective are mediated. As the techniques such as deliberation and contestation, 
which enable this mediating transference are themselves only learnable in the context 
of participation and engagement, learning is itself a constitutive democratic project   
 
 
Global learning as democratic participation 
 
If learning is now represented as social and political engagement in a global 
community, it constitutes a form of participation. 
 
 In liberal theory participation was represented as optional for the individual who was 
defined as ontologically existed prior to, and therefore outside of, the political 
community.  
 
In a social view of selfhood participation is coterminous with any form of agency – 
whether in language, or communication, or institutional engagement.  
 
Given the exclusionary and disequalising tendencies of power, participation theory 
strives to enumerate more or better quality of inclusion. As well as permit inclusion, 
any adequate conception must promote a specific conception of involvement, 
pertaining to the uptake of skills and knowledge in order to empower their lives and 
others.  
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In this sense participation involves learning in a mutually reciprocal process as the 
basis of survival in a constantly changing global society.  
 
Participation also requires a theory of freedom or liberation.  
 
As each individual is interconnected with others and the structures of support, the free 
action of each is linked to the free action of all.  
 
Yet for participation to enable freedom it must be democratically structured.  
 
If post 9/11 makes learning for democracy of more pressing concern; our conception 
has moved a long way from a narrow theory of universal enfranchisement.  
 
 To the extent that counter-terrorist action now constitutes an important item, it must 
itself be subject to the democratic norms of public visibility and critical scrutiny, 
together with open processes of deliberation and debate, as well as traditional rights of 
contestation in terms of the rule of law.   
 
If our substantive conception posits certain general ends, which allow for a degree of 
diversity and pluralism, our procedural view of democracy is as a multifaceted array 
of mechanisms and processes instituted to ensure the inclusion, security or safety as 
well as development and opportunities of all individuals and groups.   
 
In this respect research needs to focus of the means of deepening democracy to satisfy 
these goals.  As a way of concluding this article, it might look to include research on 
all or any of the following themes: 
 
 The concern with equality:  the development of any conception of democratic 
justice embodying a concept of learning must seek to deal rather than avoid issues 
to do with distribution of resources and life chances.   
 
 Learning as participation in the global community is not possible except where 
resources and human needs are satisfied. It is important to theorise the 
implications of a social ontological framework of community for considerations of 
democratic justice as it pertains to distributional ethics if the learning community 
is to be a reality.  Community in this sense is definable as an all-encompassing 
arena without fixed borders or unity, which comprises an assortment of values, 
norms and institutions that enable life to be lived.   
 
 Such a conception of community recognises social ties and shared values, as well 
as practices of voluntary action and public institutions like education which 
constitute the conditions for stability and reproduction of society.   
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 Although neoliberal philosophers like Robert Nozick (1974) have shifted political 
philosophy away from a concern with issues of distributive justice in recent years, 
my own view is similar to the nineteenth century social democrat L.T.Hobhouse 
who held that ones entitlement to rewards and gain must be balanced by one’s 
obligation to society.   
 
 What liberal conceptions of democracy obscured, in Hobhouse’s view, was the 
inter-dependence between individuals and the social structure or for the social and 
moral obligation of the society (acting through the vehicle of the state) to assist in 
arranging the social futures of each rising generation.  As he argued in his book, 
Liberalism (1911: 189-190), in his justification for redistributive policies of 
progressive taxation, the state has an obligation to enforce reasonable conditions 
of equality on the basis that while a society should provide the conditions for 
learning and enterprise, all individuals are correspondingly indebted to society for 
the conditions and structures provided, and on this basis, individuals should 
contribute in direct proportion to the luck or good fortune they experience. 
 
 The role of the state:  The role of the state should be concerned with 
guaranteeing access to education and knowledge, as well as information and skills 
as a fundamental right.   
 
 The state’s obligations as regards learning involve it in developing 
opportunities based on people’s rights to inclusion and the development of their 
capacities.  This obligation gives the state a role in the provision of social services, 
health care, and education.  In brief, the role for the positively geared state lies in 
relation to socially directed investment decisions, to provide for the general 
conditions for all species needs and development, including education and 
training, and to create and maintain quality infrastructure such as schools, 
hospitals, parks and public spaces and learning opportunities. 
 
 The development of civil society:    Civil society refers to that sector of private 
associations relatively autonomous from the state and economy, which spring 
from the everyday lives and activities of communities of interest.  It is clearly 
pivotal for learning.  Clearly, one principle of democracy is the idea of 
deliberation encompassing learning in the arts of dialogue. Another principle of 
democracy is the right to contest, challenge or oppose.  If democracy is rule by the 
people, the ability, and opportunity to “speak the truth to power”, as Michel 
Foucault (2001) has put it, is itself one of democracy’s crucial rights, indeed its 
very condition.   
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 The role of education:  the role of education is crucial for learning  for 
democracy, as educational institutions, whether compulsory or post-compulsory 
intersect with, and therefore mediate between institutions like the family and those 
of the state and the economy.   
 
 Although formal institutions of education have been in the main public 
institutions, there is an important sense in which they are semi-autonomous from 
the state.   
 
 This is not the neo-liberal sense where management and administration are 
devolved to the local school, but the sense in which the school’s are located in, 
and represent local community groups. In this sense, schools are important as 
democratic organisations, through the particular way that they are connected to 
communities, through their ability to empower families, and involve minority 
groups in participatory projects.   
 
 Education also is crucial as the central agency responsible for the production of 
democratic norms such as trust and political decision-making.  This is to say, as 
Mill (1910) recognised in Representative Government, educational institutions are 
important as sites where democracy and self-government are learnt.   
 
 Deliberative democracy is especially complex, for it involves not just norms and 
procedures of debate but norms and procedures of contestation, inclusiveness, 
tolerance, compromise, solidarity with others, generosity, care, the operations of 
forums, and of checks and balances, the use of sanctions and screens, and the 
separation of powers.  
 
 In the republican tradition, schools are instrumental in the development of civic 
virtue and habits of good citizenship.  This is what signals the real importance of 
the “knowledge economy”.  For education is essentially important in its role of 
constructing democratic civic norms, and this must become one of the central 
aims of Government policy in this regard. It is not a case of ‘brainwashing’ or 
‘socialisation’ but of teaching skills and establishing models of civic conduct 
based on tolerance, deliberation, conflict resolution, give and take, and trust.  
While educational processes depend upon fairness of political processes, and in 
the distribution of economic resources, education is necessary to construct the 
network of norms that permit both the market and democracy to function.  As 
Philip Pettit (1997: 255) puts it, education represents a “stark choice between the 
invisible hand and the iron hand: between a strategy of marketing and a strategy of 
management”.  It is this reason of course why education should ideally be public, 
universal compulsory and free. For if education is vital in constructing norms that 
nurtures the market, it cannot be itself subject to the market’s disorganising 
effects.  
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1
 The English Translator states that “Foucault is playing on the double meaning in French of the verb 
conduire – to lead or to drive, and se conduire – to behave or conduct oneself, whence la conduite, 
conduct or behaviour. (See Foucault 1982: 221, note 2) 
2
 My analysis relies on Lemke (1997, 2001) and on Foucault (1997b)  
3
 Taylorism characterized wage/labour relations that slowly emerged in industry during the later years 
of the nineteenth century based on fragmentation and competition, while Fordism describes relations 
that became dominant since the 1950s, which prolonged the Taylorist mode through mechanization and 
factory organisation. (see Boyer, 1988) 
